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Obligations
Bruce V. Schewe"
Kent A. Lambert"
During the last year, the courts of Louisiana addressed a wide spectrum of
significant issues in the arena of obligations, including contractual interference,'
quasi contracts, 2 stipulations pour autrui, 3 parol evidence,4 redhibition,'
enforcement of contracts, 6 exculpatory agreements,7 oral contracts, compromis-
es, 9 options,'0 conditional obligations," the sale of litigious rights, 2 the
dation en paiement, 3 damages, 4 noncompetition pacts," error,'6 subroga-
Copyright 1995, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
* Lecturer in Civil Law, Loyola University School of Law (New Orleans); member, New
Orleans, Louisiana State. and American Bar Associations.
** Member, New Orleans, Louisiana State, and American Bar Associations.
I. E.g., Durand v. McGaw, 635 So. 2d 409, 411 (La. App. 4th Cir.) ("Plaintiff had no contract
or legally protected interest in his employment necessary for a claim for tortious interference with
a contract." (citing 9 to 5 Fashions, Inc. v. Spumey, 538 So. 2d 228, 234 (La. 1989))), writ denied,
640 So. 2d 1318 (1994).
2. E.g., Fogleman v. Cajun Bag & Supply Co., 638 So. 2d 706 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1994);
Belgard v. Collins, 628 So. 2d 1254 (La. App. 3d Cit. 1993).
3. E.g., Rivnor Properties v. Herbert O'Donnell, Inc., 633 So. 2d 735 (La. App. 5th Cir.), writ
denied, 643 So. 2d 147 (1994).
4. E.g., Eiche v. East Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd., 623 So. 2d 167 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ
denied, 627 So. 2d 657 (1993).
5. E.g., Cormier v. Wise, 638 So. 2d 688 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1994); Poche v. Bayliner Marine
Corp., 632 So. 2d 1170 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1994); Johns v. American Isuzu Motors, Inc., 622 So. 2d
1208 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1993); Monk v. Scott Truck & Tractor, 619 So. 2d 890 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1993).
6. E.g., Weeks v. T.L. James & Co., 626 So. 2d 420 (La. App. 3d Cit. 1993), writ denied, 630
So. 2d 794 (1994).
7. E.g., Rosenblath's, Inc. v. Baker Indus., Inc., 634 So. 2d 969. 974 (La. App. 2d Cir.) ("All
exculpatory contracts are not ipso facto null and void; parties are free to make their own contracts
except in instances and under conditions inhibited by law, morals, or public policy."), writ denied,
640 So. 2d 1348 (1994).
8. E.g., Belgard v. Collins, 628 So. 2d 1254 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1993).
9. E.g., Brown v. Drillers, Inc., 630 So. 2d 741 (La. 1994).
10. E.g., Baro Controls, Inc. v. Prejean, 634 So. 2d 46 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1994); Pelican
Publishing Co. v. Wilson, 626 So. 2d 721 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1993).
11. E.g.. Belle Pass Terminal, Inc. v. Jolin, Inc., 634 So. 2d 466 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ
denied, 638 So. 2d 1094 (1994); Jarrell v. Carter, 632 So. 2d 321 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1993), writ
denied, 637 So. 2d 467 (1994).
12. E.g., Peoples Homestead Fed. Bank & Trust v. Laing, 637 So. 2d 604 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1994).
13. E.g., Warren v. Bergeron, 636 So. 2d 1013 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 642 So. 2d
1295 (1994);.Coldwell Banker J. Wesley Dowling & Assocs., Inc. v. City Bank & Trust, 634 So. 2d
959 (La. App. 2d Cit. 1994); Albert v. Albert, 625 So. 2d 765 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1993).
14.. E.g., Poche v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 632 So. 2d 1170 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1994).
15. E.g., Team Envtl. Servs., Inc. v. Addison, 2 F.3d 124 (5th Cir. 1993).
16. E.g., M.R. Bldg. Corp. v. Bayou Utils., Inc., 637 So. 2d 614 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1994);
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tion, t7 remedies,"8 privity, t9 and principles of interpretation.2" The follow-
ing discussion highlights a few of the more significant and interesting decisions.
A. Undisclosed Principals-Whose Contract Is It?
In Woodlawn Park Ltd. Partnership v. Doster Construction Co.,2' the
Supreme Court of Louisiana, in reversing the first circuit court of appeal, held
an undisclosed principal enjoys a right of action against the person who
contracted with the undisclosed principal's agent. The case arose as a claim by
Woodlawn Park Limited Partnership (Woodlawn Park), seeking to enforce rights
under a contract executed between Maunin-Ogden, Inc., and Doster Construction
Co. (Doster). In response to Doster's exception of no right of action, Woodlawn
Park contended that it received its rights as the "undisclosed principal" of
Maurin-Ogden, Inc. Nevertheless, both the trial court and the intermediate
appellate court sided with Doster.22
The.supreme court expressly rejected the argument that an agent of an
undisclosed principal, in negotiating a contract, is a prate-nom, acting on its own
behalf rather than for a hidden principal. 3 In reaching this conclusion, the
court ignored both Louisiana Civil Code article 298524 and the civilian concept
that third persons-including "undisclosed" participants-may claim rights only
in extraordinary circumstances, like the stipulation pour autrui.25
Washington v. Montgomery Ward Life Ins. Co., 640 So. 2d 822 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1994).
17. E.g., Martin v. Louisiana Farm Bureau Casualty Ins. Co., 638 So. 2d 1067 (La. 1994).
18. E.g., Grimsley v. Lenox, 643 So. 2d 203 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1994); Ogden v. Ogden, 643
So. 2d 245 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1994); Gordon v. Levet, 643 So. 2d 371 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1994).
19. E.g., Rivnor Properties v. Herbert O'Donnell, Inc., 633 So. 2d 735, 742 (La. App. 5th Cir.)
("[Nio action for breach of a construction contract may lie in the absence of privity of contract
between the parties ...."), writ denied, 643 So. 2d 147 (1994). See also Woodlawn Park Ltd.
Partnership v. Doster Constr. Co., 623 So. 2d 645 (La. 1993).
20. E.g., Martin Exploration Co. v. Amoco Prod. Co., 637 So. 2d 1202 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1994); Russellville Steel Co. v. A&R Excavating, Inc., 624 So. 2d II (La. App. 5th Cir., 1993).
21. 623 So. 2d 645 (La. 1993).
22. Id. at 645-46.
23. Id. at 648. This theory also formed a part of the first circuit's rationale. Woodlawn Park
Ltd. Partnership v. Doster Constr. Co., 602 So. 2d 1029, 1031 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1992). See
Teachers' Retirement Sys. v. Louisiana State Employees Retirement Sys., 444 So. 2d 193, 196-97
(La. App. Ist Cir. 1983), rev'd, 456 So. 2d 594 (1984); Bruce V. Schewe & Kent A. Lambert.
Obligations, Developments in the Law, 1992.1993. 54 La. L. Rev. 763, 771-72 (1994).
24. "A mandate, procuration or letter of attorney is an act by which one person gives power
to another to transact for him and in his name, one or several affairs."
25. In Teachers' Retirement Sys., the first circuit analyzed circumstances of an undisclosed
principal seeking to enforce the terms of a contract made by its agent. It concluded the undisclosed
principal was not a third-party beneficiary. Teachers Retirement Sys., 444 So. 2d at 195.
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Relying upon rather dusty jurisprudence to support its position,26 the supreme
court apparently invigorated a nearly half-century-old observation that the
"Louisiana jurisprudence, through a line of consistent decisions, [has] created a set
of rules, analogous to those governing 'simple agency,' to... [apply] to a situation
not [expressly] provided for in our written law. 27 While a more appropriate
analysis would have flowed from the Civil Code, the court's decision resolves its
stated concern of "recognizing that agency as a field of commercial law should be
uniform throughout the country"28 and clearly demonstrates "approval of the use
of common law agency notions in commercial transactions." 9
B. Unjust Enrichment-A Subsidiary Claim
Quasi contracts, an alternative source of obligations to ordinary conventions,
exist in two distinct categories: the transaction of another's business and the
payment of a thing not due.30 The third circuit recently addressed the actio de in
rem verso, the latter classification, 3' in Fogleman v. Cajun Bag & Supply Co. 32
Lyle 0. Fogleman was a salesman for Cajun Bag & Supply Co. (Cajun),
compensated on the basis of "straight commissions."33  Cajun conditioned
Fogleman's continuing employment upon his signing an employment contract that
included a noncompetition clause. Fogleman refused, and Cajun discharged him.
Thereafter, Fogleman claimed entitlement to commissions arising out of orders he
had placed before his severance but had been neither shipped nor invoiced by the
time of his dismissal. 4 Conceding he and Cajun had made no agreement about
commissions in this context, Fogleman relied upon the equitable doctrine of
quantum meruit, transcribed by the third circuit into a claim for unjust enrichment
or the actio de in rem verso.35
26. Woodlawn Park Ltd. Partnership v. Doster Constr. Co., 623 So. 2d 645, 648 (La. 1993)
(citing Carlisle v. Steamer Eudora & Owners, 5 La. Ann. 15 (1850); Ballister v. Hamilton, 3 La. Ann.
401 (1848); Williams v. Winchester, 7 Mart. (n.s.) 22 (La. 1828); Teche Concrete, Inc. v. Moity, 168
So. 2d 347 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964), writ denied, 170 So. 2d 509 (1965)).
27. Fred W. Jones, Juridical Basis of Principal-Third Party Liability in Louisiana Undisclosed
Agency Cases, 8 La. L. Rev. 409, 415 (1948).
28. Woodlawn Park Ltd. Partnership, 623 So. 2d at 647-48.
29. ld. at 648.
30. "All acts, from which there results an obligation without any agreement, ... form quasi
contracts. But there are two principal kinds which give rise to them, to-wit: The transaction of
another's business, and the payment of a thing not due." La. Civ. Code art. 2294.
31. For a brief discussion of the former category, traditionally referred to as negotiorum gestio
or gestio d'affaiie d'alhui, see Schewe & Lambert, supra note 23, at 766-67.
32. 638 So. 2d 706 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1994).
33. Id. at 707.
34. At the trial of the case, Cajun's principal "testified that commissions were earned only when
the products were shipped and invoiced, not when the customer placed the order." Id.
35. When "a plaintiff seeks to employ a quantum meruit theory as a substantive ground for
recovery, we believe the analysis is more properly made under the doctrine of actio de in rem verso
or unjust enrichment." Id. at 709.
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Since Minyard v. Curtis Products, Inc.,36 the courts have set forth five
prerequisites to a claim for unjust enrichment: (i) an enrichment of the defendant;
(ii) an impoverishment of the plaintiff; (iii) a causal relationship between the
defendant's enrichment and the plaintiff's impoverishment; (iv) the absence of a
justification for the defendant's enrichment or the plaintiff's impoverishment; and
(v) the absence of some other legal remedy available to the plaintiff.37 Focusing
first upon the final factor, the court in Fogleman declared that "[s]ince there was
no contract under which Mr. Fogleman could recover, the requirement that no other
remedy at law exists is fulfilled." 38 The court's adumbrated application of this
"subsidiarity" requirement, equating the inability to recover under applicable rules
of law with the absence of applicable law, merits attention.
Traditionally, the actio de in rem verso had its roots either in Articles 2139 and
1965'° of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870-relying on the availability of equity,
in the civilian sense, in the absence of express law--or in quasi contract under
Louisiana Civil Code articles 2292, 2293, and 2294. 4' The supreme court
addressed the source of the actio de in rem verso in Edmonsion v. A-Second
Mortgage Co.42 and focused upon old Articles 21 and 1965.43 Under this
interpretation, consistent with French law, the actio de in rem verso is as a
subsidiary claim, for the action is purely a creature born out of equity, available
merely to remedy the otherwise unaddressed.' In contrast, when the legislature
has addressed a subject, equity is never an issue.
36. 251 La. 624, 205 So. 2d 422 (1967).
37. See, e.g., Kirkpatrick v. Young, 456 So. 2d 622, 624 (La. 1984); Creely v. Leasure Living,
Inc., 437 So. 2d 816, 821-22 (La. 1983). The court in Minyard noted "the action will only be
allowed when there is no other remedy at law, i.e., the action is subsidiary or corrective in nature."
Minyard, 251 La. at 652, 205 So. 2d at 432.
38. Fogleman v. Cajun Bag & Supply Co., 638 So. 2d 706, 709 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1994). This
is a slippery point, however. The evidence at trial showed Cajun paid commissions to its salesmen
after shipping and billing; furthermore, Mr. Fogleman had, in the past, received commissions for sales
he did not solicit. Accordingly, the gap in the compensation understanding between Cajun and Mr.
Fogleman-not addressing one way or another MroFogleman's entitlement to commissions for
solicited sales not yet shipped or invoiced-does not necessarily direct the court to state that, because
"there was no contract under which Mr. Fogleman could recover, the requirement that no other
remedy ... exists is fulfilled." Id." The court should decide at the outset whether the absence of an
agreement on this issue suggests Mr. Fogleman should not recover. Only when the court rejects this
premise does it appropriately examine Mr. Fogleman's unjust enrichment allegation.
39. La. Civ. Code art. 21 (1870) authorized the courts to decide cases according to equity only
"where there is no express law."
40. La. Civ. Code art. 1965 (1870) provided that "no one ought to enrich himself at the expense
of another."
41. See, e.g., Minyard, 251 La. at 652, 205 So. 2d at 432. See also Edmonston v. A-Second
Mortgage Co., 289 So. 2d 116, 120-23 (La. 1974).
42. 289 So. 2d 116 (La. 1974).
43. "This restitutionary remedy is founded upon principles of unjust enrichment embodied in
La. Civ. Code arts. 21 and 1965." Id. at 120.
44. The actio de in rem verso "is used to fill a gap in the law where no express remedy is
provided." Id. Additionally, the court in Edmonston admonished the bench and the bar to consider
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The court in Minyard attempted to articulate the limited nature of the claim for
unjust enrichment when it explained the function of the subsidiarity requirement as
"an aspect of the principle that the action must not be allowed to defeat the purpose
of a rule of law directed to the matter at issue. It must not, in the language of some
writers, 'perpetuate a fraud on the law."' 4 s Regrettably, this cryptic language did
not sufficiently discourage persons from pressing dubious unjust enrichment
demands, and the courts have left a void in this area that calls for a "judicial
message . .. to show clearly the strict limitations 4 6 upon the claim of unjust
enrichment.
To add another wrinkle, the legislature's revision of Louisiana Civil Code
article 1757, as part of the omnibus revamp of the law of obligations in 1984,
arguably altered the gap-stop nature of the actio de in rem verso. As revised,
Article 1757 reads as follows:
Obligations arise from contracts and other declarations of will. They also
arise directly from the law, regardless of a declaration of will, in instances
such as wrongful acts, the management of the affairs of another, unjust
enrichment and other acts or facts.
47
Considering the language of Article 1757, the legislature probably did not intend
any change in the nature of the actio de in rem verso. But, given the courts'
expansive treatment of the remedy, it is plausible that a court may read into the
language of Article 1757 something not intended by the legislature. Fortunately
and correctly, to date, this has not occurred.
Against this backdrop, Fogleman presents another opportunity to examine
Minyard and its progeny and to restate the risk to the integrity of the Civil Code and
the other legislation in Louisiana. And while reasonable minds may differ about
the third circuit's conclusion in Fogleman, it is an important decision in that it
recognized the unjust enrichment claim as subsidiary in nature and limited to rare
instances.
C. On Hand Me Downs-Transfers of Litigious Rights
The law of Louisiana, consistent with its civilian tradition, while generally not
forbidding the sale of litigious rights48 has long discouraged speculation in
lawsuits.49 One method the legislature has employed to discourage dealing in
pending claims is embodied in Louisiana Civil Code article 2652:
carefully the five prerequisites "[t]o deter courts from turning to equity to remedy every unjust
displacement of wealth with unregulated discretion." Id.
45. Minyard, 251 La. at 652, 205 So. 2d at 433.
46. Bruce V. Schewe, Obligations, Developments in the Law, 1983.1984, 45 La. L. Rev. 447,
465 (1985).
47. Emphasis added.
48. La. Civ. Code arts. 2447, 2652-2654.
49. E.g., McClung v. Atlas Oil Co., 148 La. 674, 87 So. 515 (1921).
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He against whom a litigious right has been transferred, may get himself
released by paying to the transferee the real price of the transfer, together
with interest from its date.
As noted by the supreme court in Smith v. Cook,'° one purpose underlying this
release mechanism is "[tlo prevent the purchasing of claims from avarice or to
injure the debtor."
The Louisiana Second Circuit Court of Appeal recently addressed an
interesting scenario involving the issue of the sale of litigious rights in Peoples
Homestead Federal Bank & Trust v. Laing." People's Homestead Federal Bank
& Trust (People's Bank) brought a suit against Fred Laing, seeking to collect a debt
evidenced by a promissory note. After People's Bank filed the petition, the
Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC), upon a declaration of People's Bank's
insolvency, took possession of the note and substituted itself as the plaintiff in the
case against Laing. Subsequently, the RTC assigned the note to Dennis Joslin,
who amended the petition to substitute himself as the plaintiff. Laing responded
by reserving a defense against Joslin under Louisiana Civil Code article 2652. In
turn, Joslin moved to strike Laing's reservation. The district court granted Joslin's
request."2
On review, the second circuit relied on federal jurisprudence" providing that
federal regulatory agencies may, in general, obtain the rights and assets of insolvent
institutions without regard to limitations otherwise applicable to the transfer of
those rights under the various laws of the states.-4 The court also relied on a
federal district court decision, FDIC v. Orrill," to the effect that the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) is immune from defenses found in state laws
on commercial paper/negotiable instruments because the FDIC receives the assets
of a failed financial institution without notice of defenses that the makers of
negotiable instruments may have against the insolvent lender/holder. 6 Noting the
role of these decisions in the scheme of federal bank rehabilitations, 7 the second
50. 189 La. 632, 641, 180 So. 469, 472 (1937) (quoting Ferdinand MacKeldy, Handbook of
the Roman Law § 369, at 294 (1883)).
51. 637 So. 2d 604 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1994).
52. Id. at 605.
53. See, e.g., FDIC v. Bledsoe, 989 F.2d 805 (5th Cir. 1993); NCNB Tex. Nat'l Bank v.
Cowden, 895 F.2d 1488 (5th Cir. 1990).
54. Laing, 637 So. 2d at 606.
55. 771 F. Supp. 777 (E.D. La. 1991). aftd, 978 F.2d 711 (5th Cir. 1992).
56. Laing, 637 So. 2d at 606.
57. The second circuit substantiated its invocation and extension of Orrill as follows:
[Blulk transfers and the ability of federal agencies to estimate the value of a thrift's assets,
simply by analyzing its books and records, are often essential elements in saving a
distressed institution.
Subjecting the RTC or its assignees to the litigious redemption doctrine would wreak
havoc with the agency's ability to perform its statutorily mandated function of managing
failed thrifts.
Id. (citations omitted).
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circuit extended their reach to include individuals acquiring litigious rights from
assuming federal agencies.5 8 In so doing, the court reasoned that under Louisiana
Revised Statutes 10:3-203, the transfer of a negotiable instrument includes all of the
rights held by the transferor.5 9 Accordingly, Laing's defense, grounded in Article
2652, had no more effect against Joslin than it would have had against the RTC.
The second circuit's opinion is confounding and flawed. The decision in Orrill
was predicated upon D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC,' which barred defenses
based upon the status of the FDIC, not upon consideration of the relative merits of
the laws of the states and the federal statutes and regulations. That was not a
concern in Laing, notwithstanding suggestions to the contrary by the court. Further,
the second circuit's view of Orrill was mistaken. The decision in Orrill, issued by
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana and affirmed
without opinion by the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, is questionable
inasmuch as Article 2652 is not contrary to any federal law or regulation. Nothing
in the federal scheme of failed financial institution rehabilitation or liquidation
empowers persons acquiring things from the FDIC or the RTC, particularly as an
isolated transaction and not in bulk, to claim all of the shields and immunities that
the FDIC or the RTC may assert. Further, Article 2652 does not empower a debtor-
defendant to urge a pre-existing defense; it arises out of the transfer of a litigious
right. Thus, wholly apart from any availability of defenses against the FDIC or the
RTC-initial transferees-nothing in the federal regulatory scheme for rehabilitat-
ing financial institutions dictates that the courts should ignore state laws when
dealing with persons purchasing commercial paper from the FDIC or the RTC.
While the second circuit identified conflicting policy concerns implicated by
the assumption of litigious rights by the RTC, it failed to explain why it displaced
the policy choice represented by Article 2652 when neither the RTC nor the FDIC
was a party to the litigation. Oddly, the court allowed Joslin to secure greater
rights, unassailable by Article 2652, because he purchased a litigious right from the
RTC and not from the People's Bank. That is troubling.
D. Receipt of Less than Expected-Two Remedies
Followers of the jurisprudence dealing with the proof necessary to maintain
"redhibition" actions, if asked to define what sort of vice would qualify as
"redhibitory," likely would say the defect must be grave enough to render the thing
sold "absolutely useless, or its use so inconvenient and imperfect, that it must be
58. Id.
59. Id. La. R.S. 10:3-203(b) (1993) reads in part: "Transfer of an instrument, whether or not
the transfer is a negotiation, vests in the transferee any right of the transferor to enforce the
instrument, including any right as a holder in due course ...."
60. 315 U.S. 447, 62 S. Ct. 676 (1942). The Supreme Court, in the words of the second
circuit, recognized "a common law rule of estoppel precluding a borrower from asserting against a
federal regulatory agency defenses based upon secret or unrecorded side agreements which alter the
terms of the facially unqualified obligation." Laing, 637 So. 2d at 607 n.l.
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supposed that the buyer would not have purchased it, had he known of the vice.'
In Dodson v. Walker,6 the supreme court reminded the bench and the bar that this
generalized definition presents only a part of the story, and it does not extend to
claims in quanti minoris.
63
The court confronted the propriety of a jury instruction "asking [the jury] to
determine solely if the evidence showed that the... [thing sold] contained a defect
which rendered it either absolutely useless or its use so inconvenient and imperfect
that the buyer would not have purchased it had they known of the vice."' Noting
that "[u]nder Louisiana Civil Code article 2543, the judge in a redhibition suit 'may
decree merely a reduction of the [purchase] price,' ' '6$ the court declared that the
district court erred by excluding the lesser standard of proof attendant to a claim in
quanti minoris. The decision, preserving the trial court's control over an action in
redhibition and its subspecies, quanti minoris, is appropriate and serves as a useful
reminder of this remedy.
E. If It Barks, It is a Dog-Classification of Contracts
In Bamma Leasing Co. v. Secretary of Department of Revenue & Taxation,
the fifth circuit addressed the seemingly elusive distinction drawn in the jurispru-
dence between a lease with an option to purchase and a "disguised conditional
sale." Bamma Leasing Co. arose in the context of a tax dispute predicated in part
upon whether various transactions entered into by a corporation engaged in the
lease financing of automobiles should be classified as financed leases or as
conditional sales, the latter being exempt from certain disputed lease taxes.67 In
this light, the court listed three categories of lease financing contracts: (i) contracts
providing for the lease of vehicles with a right to purchase at the end of the lease
period upon the payment of a "substantial" charge; (ii) agreements omitting any
mention of an option to buy; and (iii) contracts purporting to stipulate for lease
payments on new cars at a value and for a duration sufficient to account for the
vehicle's sale price, with an option to the seller at the end of the lease term to
purchase the automobile for $1.00. With respect to the third type of arrangement,
the court stated as follows:
The distinction between a valid "lease with option to purchase" and a
disguised "conditional sale" is that in the former, there is an option to give
additional consideration in order to purchase the leased item at the end of
61. La. Civ. Code art. 2520.
62. 630 So. 2d 247 (La. 1994).
63. "Whether the defect in the thing sold be such as to render it useless and altogether unsuited
to its purpose, or whether it be such as merely to diminish its value, the buyer may limit his demand
to the reduction of the price." La. Civ. Code art. 2541 (emphasis added).
64. Dodson, 630 So. 2d at 247.
65. Id. (citing La. Civ. Code art. 2543).
66. No. 93-CA-881, 1994 WL 498664 (La. App. 5th Cir. Sept. 4, 1994).
67. See La. R.S. 47:302(B) (1990).
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the contract term, while in the latter, there is an obligation to pay the full
price regardless of whether the option is exercised or not
6 8
The court's separation of conditional sales from leases with options to buy has
a long history in the jurisprudence. In Byrd v. Cooper,"9 the supreme court
observed the following:
[A] so-called contract of lease by which the lessee binds himself at once
and irrevocably for a rental equal to the full value of the thing leased, and
is to become owner thereof when the so-called rental is paid in full, and
without the payment of any further consideration, is nothing else than a
conditional sale disguised under the form of a so-called lease; and the
effect of such a contract is to vest title in the so-called lessee, i.e.,
purchaser.
Similarly, in Pastorek v. Lanier Systems Co.,70 the fourth circuit noted that a
purported lease arrangement-reciting that upon completion of the lease term the
lessee may pay $1.00 and exercise an option to purchase-was not really a lease.
Rather, it was a disguised sale and its terms were designed for the seller "to retain
title until payment of the purchase price.""
Notwithstanding this line of jurisprudence, the court in Bamma Leasing Co.
ruled all three of the categories of lease transactions were leases. The result
reached by the court is confusing because seventeen of the forty-five "leases" in
dispute were of the $100 option charge category and appear to bear no difference
in principle from the "leases" identified as sales by the fourth circuit in Easy T.V.
& Appliance Rental of Louisiana, Inc. v. Secretary of Department of Revenue and
Taxation.'
2
While the fifth circuit noted the lack of evidence of whether the majority of the
purported lessees in the third category had actually availed themselves of the $1.00
option, this information may not be relevant. There is nothing to suggest the parties
intended these contracts to be leases, nor to suggest the lessor wished to reclaim the
vehicles at the end of the lease term. 3 It may be that the outcome reflects the
court's concern with what it perceived as a "tax dodge"; accordingly, the case's
68. Bamma Leasing Co., 1994 WL 498664, at *3.
69. 166 La. 402, 404, 117 So. 441, 442 (1928).
70. 249 So. 2d 224 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1971).
71. Id. at 227 (citing Grapico Bottling Works v. Liquid Carbonic Co., 163 La. 1057, 113 So.
454 (1927); Graham Glass Co. v. Nu-Grape Bottling Co., 164 La. 1103, 115 So. 285 (1927)). See
also Easy T.V. & Appliance Rental of La., Inc. v. Secretary of Dep't of Revenue & Taxation, 556
So. 2d 100 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 559 So. 2d 1375 (1990), in which the alleged lessor did
not intend to have the item returned for re-rental, but sought to transfer its title upon full payment
to the purported lessee.
72. Easy T. V. & Appliance Rental of La., Inc., 556 So. 2d at 102.
73. "Interpretation of a contract is the determination of the common intent of the parties." La.
Civ. Code art. 2045.
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precedential value may be limited. Nevertheless, the court's language is confusing
and overreaching.
F. Insurers, Legal Subrogation, and Windfalls?
Fifteen years ago, Professor Johnson noted "a curious dichotomy in Louisiana
law on the question of legal subrogation of an insurer to the rights of its insured
against a wrongdoer upon payment of the insured's claim." '74 His observation,
unfortunately, is still timely. Professor Johnson was commenting upon the fourth
circuit's decision in Courtney v. Harris,7 which refused to extend the ambit of
legal subrogation to an insurer that had compensated its insured for injuries suffered
in a car accident. He criticized the court's refusal to recognize subrogation, as a
matter of law, by the insurer to the insured's rights against the tortfeasor, thereby
allowing the tortfeasor to escape responsibility. In Professor Johnson's view, the
tortfeasor received an unwarranted windfall that would ultimately be "reflected in
even higher premiums on these types of insurance."76 Several years later, in an
apparent advancement on this front, the supreme court commendably decidedAetna
Insurance Co. v. Naquin77 and concluded the insurer was legally subrogated to the
rights of the insured upon payment of the insured's claim. The opinion seemed to
resolve that issue.78
Unfortunately, the supreme court recently held in Martin v. Louisiana Farm
Bureau Casualty Insurance CO. 79 that a health and accident insurer, after making
medical payments on behalf of its insured, was not legally subrogated to its
insured's claims against the tortfeasor.8° This unhappy result and the broad
language in the court's opinion plunges this area of Louisiana law into an
unfortunate and unnecessary state of confusion.
Pursuant to Louisiana Civil Code article 1825, subrogation substitutes one
person to the rights of another."' To appreciate the role of subrogation in the Civil
Code,82 a brief discussion of performance and extinguishment of obligations is
74. H. Alston Johnson 111, Obligations, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts, 1977-
1978, 39 La. L. Rev. 675, 675 (1979).
75. 355 So. 2d 1039 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978).
76. Johnson, supra note 74, at 684. "Although the insured pays for this coverage, the rate
structure ought to reflect the record of success of the insurer in casting this loss back on the
wrongdoer when possible ... ." Id.
77. 488 So. 2d 950 (La. 1986). See Bruce V. Schewe, Obligations, Developments in the Law,
1985.1986, 47 La. L. Rev. 377, 383-87 (1986).
78. Bruce V. Schewe & Robert L. Theriot, Obligations, Developments in the Law, 1987-1988,
49 La. L. Rev. 463, 472 (1988).
79. 638 So. 2d 1067 (La. 1994).
80.. "A medical insurer contracts to pay stipulated medical expenses, regardless of whether there
is a tortfeasor and tort liability." Id. at 1069.
81. "Subrogation is the substitution of one person to the rights of another. It may be
conventional or legal." La. Civ. Code art. 1825
82. See La. Civ. Code arts. 1825-1830.
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helpful. Ordinarily, the debtor performs his obligation.83 In other instances, a
third person may perform vis-a-vis the creditor, and the creditor thereafter may not
demand performance from his obligor. But the obligor is not necessarily liberated
from performing vis-a-vis the performing third person." To illustrate, one who
pays a debt for another may enjoy a claim in quasi contract (either as a gestion d'
affairs or as an unjust enrichment), 3 under the rules of mandate," or under the
portion of the Civil Code governing loans. 87 Often, however, since these rights
are not as useful as those possessed by the creditor, the Civil Code affords, through
subrogation, a mechanism whereby the person paying in the obligor's stead may
acquire the rights of the creditor."8 Certain commentators have painted subroga-
tion as a limited legal fiction whereby an obligation, although extinguished as to the
original creditor by performance from one other than the ultimate obligor, subsists
in favor of the person rendering the performance, to permit a claim against the
obligor.89 The redactors of the Civil Code, however, rejected this formulation in
favor of treating subrogation as a device for the transfer of obligations, instead of
as a fictionalized exception to the general rules of extinguishment of obligations.'
Legal subrogation operates to substitute the person who has performed an
obligation of another to the rights of the creditor. In instances when the person
rendering a performance (or a transfer) benefitting another was himself bound to
perform it or from which he also obtains a benefit, the existence of legal subroga-
tion serves the admirable policy of encouraging that person's performance under
conflicting circumstances."
Louisiana Civil Code article 1829 governs legal subrogation. Pursuant to
paragraph (3) of that article, legal subrogation takes place by operation of law in
favor of an obligor who pays a debt he owes with others or for others and who has
recourse against those others as a result of payment. On its face, the legislation
distinguishes between an obligor bound with others as a principal and one bound
83. See La. Civ. Code art. 1854.
84. See, e.g., 2 Marcel Planiol & George Ripert, Treatise on the Civil Law (Louisiana State
Law Institute trans., West 1959) (1939) § 473(2), at 271. See also Saul Litvinoff, The Law of
Obligations, in 5 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise § 11.1-.59, at 268-306 (1992).
85. See La. Civ. Code arts. 2295, 2299.
86. See La. Civ. Code arts. 2985, 3022, 3025.
87. See La. Civ. Code arts. 2910. 2920, 2921.
88. La. Civ. Code art. 1826 & cmts. (a)-(e), in Louisiana Civil Code (A.N. Yiannopoulos ed.,
West 1994).
89. See, e.g., Planiol & Ripert, supra note 84, § 477, at 273. See also Aubry & Rau, Droit
Civil Francais: Obligations § 321, at 187-210, in I Civil Law Translations (Louisiana State Law
Institute trans., 1965).
90. La. Civ. Code art. 1826 & cmts. (a)-(e), in Louisiana Civil Code, supra note 88.
Importantly, at common law subrogation is a purely equitable doctrine vested solely in the discretion
of the court rather than, as it is in Louisiana, a matter of statutory law. See Author Buckland, A
Text-Book of Roman Law from Augustus to Justinian 449, 565 (2d. ed. 1950), cited in Litvinoff,
supra note 84, § 11.5, at 274.
91. See, e.g., Duchamp v. Dantilly. 9 La. Ann. 247 (1854); R.F. Mestayer Lumber Co. v.
Cusack, 141 So. 2d 166 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
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for others as an accessory. Obvious examples of the former include a solidary
debtor and one of several obligors concerning an indivisible debt. The crucial issue
seems to be whether the person who rendered the performance, while an obligor,
was bound such that the law affords him, upon his satisfaction of the obligation,
recourse against the ultimate obligor, as in the instances of quasi contracts or
mandate.92 Subrogation as a matter of law, plainly, does not require that the
obligations of the various debtors derive from the same source.93
Curiously, against this backdrop, both the intermediate appellate court and the
supreme court in Martin concluded that a health insurer-because its obligation is
not conditioned upon the negligence or liability of the third person tortfeasor-is
not entitled to claim legal subrogation to the insured's rights'against the tortfeasor
to recover its payment of medical bills. This is odd because no one can contend
both the insurer and the tortfeasor were not bound with one another in favor of the
insured for reparation of the injuries sustained by the insured (including medical
expenses), albeit one by contract and the other in tort. Indeed,
[t]he court would have been on firm ground if it had stated that [the
insurer] was solidarily liable with [the tortfeasor] ... vis-a-vis the
[insured/victim]. Additionally, the court would have been justified in so
doing if it had likened (the insurer] to an uninsured/underinsured motorist
carrier and, thus, liable in solido with [the tortfeasor] for the claims of the
[insured/victim] or [the tortfeasor] or both.' 4
The court in Martin conceded that "[a]n insurer bound to repair the damage caused
by a tortfeasor is solidarily li able with the tortfeasor because both are obliged to the
same thing-repair of the tort damage." 9  The court stated, however, that a
medical insurer that contracts to pay stipulated medical expenses, regardless of the
presence of a tortfeasor, is not obligated to repair the same injury as is the
tortfeasor.96 The court's point, apparently, is symptomatic of its focusing upon
the source of each debtor's obligation instead of concentrating on the obligation
owed, as Article 1829(3) provides.97
The court's effort to distinguish Naquin, by focusing upon the type of damage
caused by a tortfeasor for which an insurer responds, is also strained and confusing:
92.: See, e.g., Hart v. Polizzotto, 168 La. 356, 122 So. 64 (1929); Succession of Whitehead, 3
La. Ann. 396 (1848); Hilgenfeld v. Hilgenfeld, 180 So. 2d 236 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1965); Carpenter
v. Cox, 186 So. 863 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1938).
93. See La. Civ. Code art. 1797.
94. Schewe, supra note 77. at 386.
95. Martin v. Louisiana Farm Bureau Casualty Ins. Co., 638 So. 2d 1067, 1069 (La. 1994)
(citing Fertitta v. Allstate Ins. Co., 462 So. 2d 159 (La. 1985)).
96. Id.
97. Id." The court noted: "The medical insurer thus pays its own debt, not that of the
tortfeasor, and the two are not obligated to 'the same thing."' Id. (citing Fertitta, 462 So. 2d at 164
n.7).
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Aetna Ins. Co. v. Naquin allowed the insurer of rental property subroga-
tion recovery against a negligent roofing contractor. In Naquin, both the
insurer and the negligent roofer were bound for payment of the leaking
roof damages. Naquin was a property damage exception to the general
rule, which should not be extended to health and accident insurance."
Aside from the type of injury-property damages versus medical expenses-there
is no rationale for the court's limitation of the Naquin decision. Certainly, the
court's casual dismissal of Naquin as an "exception to the general rule" should, at
a minimum, prompt an examination of "the general rule," when it is the flawed
creature.
Perhaps the most disturbing part of the supreme court's opinion is its invention
of a public policy against legal subrogation in this situation: "Legal subrogation
would bestow a windfall on [the insurer], which did not bargain for that benefit."99
The court oddly juxtaposed this point against the policy concerns set forth in
Naquin:
[L]egal subrogation is the more desirable and legally cohesive rule. First
and foremost are the promptness and certainty of recovery guaranteed the
victim. The victim will receive from the wrongdoer and his insurer the
full amount of his damages. He will also receive this payment quickly
from his insurer, especially if the insurer knows it will later be able to
recover from the wrongdoer. If the insurer is able to be reimbursed for a
loss caused by another's fault, this success will be reflected in lower
premiums. Although the insured is paying for this quick and prompt
coverage, the premium he pays ought to reflect the record of success of
the insurer in casting this loss back on the wrongdoer when possible. To
refuse to give the insurer a right to subrogation is to cast the loss on the
insured class, rather than the person by whose fault the loss occurred.
This undoubtedly has the effect of higher premiums on these types of
insurance. Neither can the wrongdoer complain that he has not been
accorded a reduction in the damages which he has caused. Society has an
interest in requiring the wrongdoer to pay the full amount of damage he
has caused if he is able. to
98. Id. (citation omitted).
99. Id. at 1070 (emphasis added).
100. Aetna Ins. Co. v. Naquin, 488 So. 2d 950, 954 (La. 1986) (emphasis added). The court's
language in Naquin tracked the concerns articulated by Professor Johnson:
Should there be a rule of law (legal subrogation) which would require that a proven
wrongdoer eventually bear the loss caused by his wrongdoing, by reimbursing an insurer
which may have borne that loss because of a contract with the injured party? Or. on the
other hand, should the wrongdoer escape eventual responsibility for any of the loss
because he had the good fortune to injure a party who had provided for the loss through
a contract of insurance?
Johnson, supra note 74, at 679.
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The supreme court's decision in Martin represents a profound step backwards
from Naquin. Considering that only Justice Marcus dissented from the court's
opinion,101 perhaps the legislature must intervene. Should the legislature not
suppress the result and the rationale in Martin, what should be straightforward
principals of law and public policy'02 stand to be wholly thwarted by this judicial
miscue.'
101. Martin v. Louisiana Farm Bureau Casualty Ins. Co., 638 So. 2d 1067, 1070 (La. 1994)
(Marcus, J., dissenting).
102. See, e.g., La. R.S. 46:8 (1982); La. R.S. 23:1101'(Supp. 1994); La. R.S. 23:1123 (Supp.
1994); La. R.S. 47:2105 (1990).
103. Compare Durham Life Ins. Co. v. Lee, 625 So. 2d 706 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1993), with
Martin v. Louisiana Farm Bureau Casualty Ins. Co.. 628 So. 2d 1213 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1993), afd,
638 So. 2d 1067 (1994).
[Vol. 55
